As the father of a promising young officer who has lost his life in this the most recent disaster in a hazardous branch of the Naval Service, I trust that you will give me space in your columns to appeal to public feeling against the further employment of the obsolete and worn-out class of submarines which have furnished and still furnish these appalling catastrophes from time to time.

The 'A' class as is well known, are the original trial class built when this submarine service was in it's infancy, and are neither neither provided with improvements which science has produced as the result of experience nor with the safety appliances which the later classes possess. I understand that, owing to their interior space and construction, modern appliances for prolonging life when submerged and for controlling the boats in difficulties under water cannot be fitted. In short, these boats are now little but death traps.

A 7 was merely a 'Harbour Defence" craft, and my son told me only the other day that these boats are not allowed to exercise far out like the modern submarines. What a craft of this character was doing diving in 20 fathoms (120ft.) of water I am at a loss to understand. But what is still more an enigma to me is why these craft are still bourne on the active list of the Navy.

My son, who spent a few days leave with us at Christmas, also told me that quite recently this same boat had sunk to the bottom when exercising off Plymouth and that it took them an hour of hard work to get her to the surface again. He was on board at the time. That a great nation like ours should permit some of her pluckiest and best men in all ranks to be sacrificed for the sake of retaining for a while longer a collection of unserviceable and worn-out boats, merely to satisfy Parliament with a paper strength, is almost beyond my comprehension.

If the ill-fated A 7 shall ever be raised, and I shall not be surprised if she is not considered worth the trouble and expense, there will be a naval inquiry of course, but the true cause of the disaster will not be made public, partly because these matters involve things which are supposed to be confidential and secret, and no doubt also because it is not desirable to direct attention to the unsafe conditions under which the unfortunate victims have been obliged to take the risks.

Anything I now write cannot restore to me my dead son, or to the other afflicted families their lost ones, but if it has the effect, as I hope, of rousing public opinion before this last terrible business is forgotten by all except the bereaved relatives of the victims, and leading to the question being brought before Parliament when it meets and something done to minimize the risks as far as possible to the officers and men of the submarine branch, I shall not have appealed in vain.

As an instance of how the Admiralty view the question of risk, I may mention that up to, I think, June last, all officers serving in the submarine branch, received 6s. a day extra above their rank pay in view of the risk and hardship of the service. With a view to effect some economy it was then altered so that sub-lieutenants were only to get 4s., whilst lieutenants still got 6s. As the submarine officers all said at the time, when extra pay was given for facing the extra risk, &c., identical for every officer in a boat, it was a mean distinction to make.

I think few will disagree with me when I say that the selection of some to serve in these obsolete 'coffins' is nothing short of a criminal distinction; at least I am sure it would ne held to be so if it were the act of any great steamship company and due inquiry revealed the fact.

Lt. Colonel R. H. Morrison (retired), father of
Sub-Lieutenant Robert Herman Grant Morrison
late of HMS A-7