Narrative-
1. The following report of action between the U.S.S Turner and an enemy submarine on the night of October 23, 1943 is hereby submitted.
2. On October 23, 1943 the U.S.S Turner was acting as part of the anti-submarine screen and stationed as a picket 14,000 yards slightly on the port bow of Convoy GUS-18 enroute from Gibraltar to the United States. The action took place in Lat. 34° 15’ N, Long. 23° 39’ W. The convoy was on a base course of 261° True at a speed of 9 knots. The night was cloudy and dark with poor visibility. The sea was rough (condition six) and the wind was from the North, force 4. It was impossible to distinguish either escorts of the screen or the convoy with the aid of binoculars.
3. (a) Initial contact was made by the SG radar at 1932, zone +1 time, bearing 240° True at a range of 5400 yards. The ship was brought to course 250° and tracking was commenced. Both FD and QO operators were instructed to stay well clear of bearing 240° to avoid detection of this vessel by target.
(b) At 1935 a radar plot showed target to be on an approximate course of 060° true at a speed of about six knots. Range had decreased to 3900 yards when contact was verified. General Quarters was sounded and ship’s speed increased to 20 knots. At 1942, with range at 800 yards it was decided to head for target.
(c) At 1943 target was sighted bearing 238° True, range 500 yards, and disclosed to be an enemy submarine with conning tower and decks awash plainly visible to the naked eye. The orders “Left Full Rudder” and “Commence Firing” were simultaneous.
(d) Firing was continued for about forty seconds while submarine commenced a crash dive. Four rounds of 5” 38 and 40 rounds of 20mm ammunition were expended. One five inch hit on the conning tower was probable with numerous machine gun hits in that vicinity. Decks were also effectively straffed.
(e) The submarine in all probability sighted us at the same time and came hard right to a course of about 090°. When it became apparent that ramming was impossible, the order “Right Full Rudder” was given in order to swing our stern into the now submerging submarine.
(f) At 1944 the submarine was abeam to port distant 100 yards parallel and on an opposite course to us. As it was diving, two Mark 8, 300 pound charges were fired, using #3 impulse charges from the port K-Guns and both were seen to land squarely above the submarine and explode about four seconds after striking the water. (A Mark 8 Depth Charge fired from the starboard K-Gun in error did not explode). As our stern swung around, a 600 pound Mark 7 charge set at 50 feet was dropped over the area in which the submarine had now submerged.
(g) A distinct separate explosion was heard after the depth charges had exploded. The shock of this explosion was so violent that the main board tripped out; power was lost on the SG and FD radars and the main battery and sound gear. Power was restored and the SG was back in commission about 10 minuets later. However, it was about 15 minuets before the QO was restored. After standing out about 2000 yards, course was reversed and we passed over firing point again. Various courses were then steered according to doctrine in an effort to regain contact. At 2017 radar contact was made at about 1500 yards at about 135° True. Ship was brought sharply left to head for this bearing.
Considerable smoke and a low lying object was sighted in the water to port by Commanding Officer, Chief Signalman, and three other known witnesses. At this time the Officer of the Deck reported an escort vessel of the inner screen sharp on the port bow standing toward this vessel and the ship was brought hard right to avoid collision. From this time until about 2100 the Commanding Officer and the Officer of the Deck were completely absorbed attempting to avoid collision with the escorts and the convoy. The Chief Signalman, however, and the forward port 20mm machine gunner continued to watch the object sighted and reported that it was the submarine smoking profusely and almost immediately plunged under, stern first, at an angle of 70° with the water.
Observers on the main deck reported the strong stench of chlorine and oil. Every effort was made to return to this scene, but it resulted in failure due to the fact that the convoy passed over the spot. The convoy was not cleared until 2130. About this time the U.S.S. STURTEVANT joined the hunt and a search plan was begun. At 2145 radar contact was made bearing 047° True at 4700 yards. Course was directed towards the contact. About one minute later fire was opened with full radar control.
The Gunnery Officer reported that according to the radar scope, five 5" hits were made. However, the pip still persisted and the target was closed and disappeared in the “grass” at about 1000 yards. Every effort was made to sight the target with all means available, but the ship closed and passed over the position of the target without anything being sighted. The Commanding Officer being of the opinion that it was a radar phenomenon, search was resumed as before.
Search was conducted in accordance with A/S Memo. No. 16 of November 1942 for Two Anti-Submarine Vessels One Hour Late until 0730 the next morning. One pass was made over the initial contact point as indicated by DRT (which may have been as much as 7 miles off) and no evidence obtained therefrom. Search was abandoned at this time and both vessels proceeded with dispatch to rejoin the convoy.
The Commanding Officer and all observers feel that the proximity of the exploding charges resulted in destruction of the submarine.
It is realized that while evidence is not available to substantiate this, attention of the reviewing authority is invited to the following factors:
1. The convoy passed over the spot.
2. The sea was condition six and quite rough, such that personnel could not have long survived.
3. The wind was from the North at about 22 knots.
4. Visibility was very poor and wreckage could not have been seen for about 12 hours.
5. The search for evidence was only brief and not at all conclusive. Search was not conducted down wind from initial contact during daylight hours due to fact that the Commanding Officer felt that joining the convoy was by far more important than establishing evidence.
H.S. WYGANT, Jr.
Commander, USN
Commanding Officer.
